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In Marxism, reification ((ドイツ語:Verdinglichung), literally: "making into a thing" (cf. Latin ''res'' meaning "thing") or ''Versachlichung'', literally "objectification"; regarding something impersonally) is the ''thingification'' of social relations or of those involved in them, to the extent that the nature of social relationships is expressed by the relationships between traded objects (see commodity fetishism and value-form). This implies that objects are transformed into subjects and subjects are turned into objects, with the result that subjects are rendered passive or determined, while objects are rendered as the active, determining factor. Hypostatization refers to an effect of reification which results from supposing that whatever can be named, or conceived abstractly, must actually exist, an ontological and epistemological fallacy. The concept is related to, but is distinct from, Marx's theories of alienation and commodity fetishism. Alienation is the general condition of human estrangement. Reification is a specific ''form'' of alienation. Commodity fetishism is a specific ''form'' of reification. ==Development and significance of the concept== Reification was not a particular prominent term or concept in Marx's own works, nor in that of his immediate successors. It rose to prominence chiefly through the work of Georg Lukács, in his essay "Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat", part of his book ''History and Class Consciousness''; this is the locus classicus for defining the term in its current sense. Here, Lukács treats it as a problem of capitalist society related to the prevalence of the commodity form, through a close reading of Marx's chapter on commodity fetishism in ''Capital.'' Lukács's account was influential for the philosophers of the Frankfurt School, for example in Horkheimer and Adorno's ''Dialectic of Enlightenment'', and in the works of Herbert Marcuse. Others who have written about this point include Gajo Petrović, Raya Dunayevskaya, Raymond Williams, Timothy Bewes, Axel Honneth, John Zerzan, and Slavoj Žižek. Petrović, in ''A Dictionary of Marxist Thought'', defines reification as: The act (or result of the act) of transforming human properties, relations and actions into properties, relations and actions of man‑produced things which have become independent (and which are imagined as originally independent) of man and govern his life. Also transformation of human beings into thing‑like beings which do not behave in a human way but according to the laws of the thing‑world. Reification is a ‘special’ case of ALIENATION, its most radical and widespread form characteristic of modern capitalist society.〔Gajo Petrović, A Dictionary of Marxist Thought, edited by Tom Bottomore, Laurence Harris, V.G. Kiernan, Ralph Miliband (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983), pp. 411–413 ()〕 Reification occurs when specifically human creations are misconceived as "facts of nature, results of cosmic laws, or manifestations of divine will".〔Berger, Peter, & Luckmann, Thomas. (1966). ''The social construction of reality: A treatise in the sociology of knowledge.'' New York: Anchor/Doubleday.〕 However, some recent scholarship on Lukács's own use of the term "reification" in ''History and Class Consciousness'' has challenged this interpretation of the concept, according to which reification implies that a pre-existing subject creates an objective social world which is then alienated from it. Andrew Feenberg reinterprets Lukács's central category of "consciousness" as similar to anthropological notions of culture as a set of practices.〔Feenberg, A ''Lukács, Marx and the Sources of Critical Theory'' (Rowman and Littlefield, 1981; Oxford University Press, 1986)〕〔Feenberg, A, ''The Philosophy of Praxis: Marx, Lukács and the Frankfurt School''(Verso Press, 2014)〕 The reification of consciousness in particular, therefore, is more than just an act of misrecognition; it affects the everyday social practice at a fundamental level beyond the individual subject. Other scholarship has suggested that Lukács's use of the term may have been strongly influenced by Edmund Husserl's phenomenology to understand his preoccupation with the reification of consciousness in particular.〔Westerman, R, ‘The Reification of Consciousness: Husserl’s Phenomenology in Lukács’s Subject-Object’: ''New German Critique'' 111 (Fall 2010)〕 On this reading, reification entails a stance that separates the subject from the objective world, creating a mistaken relation between subject and object that is reduced to disengaged knowing. Applied to the social world, this leaves individuals subjects feeling that society is something they can only know as an alien power, rather than interact with. In this respect, Lukács's use of the term could be seen as prefiguring some of the themes Martin Heidegger touches on in Being and Time, supporting Lucien Goldman's suggestion that Lukács and Heidegger were much closer in their philosophical concerns than typically thought.〔Goldman, L. ''Lukács and Heidegger: Towards a New Philosophy''. Trans. William Q. Boelhower. London: Routledge, 2009.〕 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「Reification (Marxism)」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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